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Schram: Homestead Exemption: What Protection for the Widow and Heirs?

CASE COMMENTS
HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION: WHAT PROTECTION
FOR THE WIDOW AND HEIRS?
Aetna Insurance Co. v. LaGasse, 223 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1969)
Respondent, subject to an outstanding judgment recorded in 1961, was
separated from her husband and lived with her fourteen-year-old daughter.
When respondent's father died in April 1965, leaving her mother a life
tenancy in his homestead property and respondent the vested remainder,
respondent abandoned her marital residence and moved with her child into
the parental home to care for her invalid mother. After the invalid mother
died in September 1965, the judgment creditor, Aetna, executed judgment
against respondent's interest in the property." Following respondent's claim
of homestead exemption, Aetna sought a declaration that its judgment lien
was superior to the homestead claim. Following judgment in favor of Aetna,
respondent appealed. The Second District Court of Appeal, finding the time
the recorded judgment attached to the remainder interest to be "wholly
immaterial," reversed, holding that because no levy, prerequisite to a forced
sale, was made until respondent had become the owner in fee, the homestead
claim was superior.2 On certiorari, the Supreme Court of Florida reversed and
HELD, with Justices Ervin and Roberts dissenting, that while a remainder
interest will not support a claim of homestead, at the inheritance the prior
recorded judgment created a lien eo instanti upon the respondent's remainder
interest in the property.3
Despite the fact that homestead exemption in Florida has long been the
subject of confusion to lawyers and laymen alike, 4 its primary purpose has
never been questioned. The law had its origin in the theory that the state's
prosperity and the citizens' independence required that each citizen have a
home where his family could live sheltered from financial misfortune. 5 Thus,
the policy of homestead exemption is to insure the preservation of the family
home despite the just demands of creditors.0 In pursuit of this, homestead
exemption provisions have been liberally construed in the interest of those
claiming the benefit7 The homestead provisions, however, cannot be utilized
1. Aetna had served as surety for the bonds furnished by the construction company of
respondent's husband. Respondent, as well as the other wives of the company's officers, had
signed an indemnity agreement in relation to the suretyship. Upon default, Aetna in
1961 recovered a judgment against all of the indemnitors.
2. LaGasse v. Aetna Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 454, 457 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
3. 223 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1969).
4. For a general discussion of homestead exemption, see Crosby & Miller, Our Legal
Chameleon, The Florida Homestead Exemption, 2 U. FLA. L. REv. 12, 219, 346 (1949).
5. Hill v. First Nat'l Bank, 79 Fla. 391, 399, 84 So. 190, 192 (1920).
6. Id.
7. Graham v. Azar, 204 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1967); Bessemer Properties, Inc. v. Gamble, 158
Fla. 38, 27 So. 2d 832 (1946); Pasco v. Harley, 73 Fla. 819, 75 So. 30 (1917); Milton v.
Milton, 63 Fla. 533, 58 So. 718 (1912).
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to foster a fraudulent means of escaping the payment of obligations., In
addition, the exemption does not protect against execution for taxes or for
any other obligation incurred in relation to the homestead property. 9 Aside
from these exceptions, any landowner who resides in the state and is the head
of a family may avail himself of the benefits of homestead exemption by
designating what constitutes his homestead either beforelo or after levy is
made upon his property." Once such a designation is made, the homestead
together with 1,000 dollars worth of personal property is exempt from forced
2
sale under process of any court.'
Although the constitution places limitations upon the amount of land
that may be exempted,13 there is no definition or limitation of estates in land
to which a homestead exemption may apply. Thus, Florida courts have
allowed the homestead exemption to attach to any estate in land, whether
freehold or less, owned by the head of a family residing in Florida. 14 Even
the mere possession of land with the consent of the owner has been deemed
of sufficient value to the occupant to support a claim of homestead exemption.' 5 Thus, any interest in the claimed homestead, either equitable or legal,
will support the exemption.16
A frequent source of confusion regarding homestead lies in determining
when the provisions of the exemption take effect. Because homestead exemptions come into being only in relation to a debt,'- the status of liens is of
great importance. Judgments and decrees become liens upon the real estate
of the debtor when they are properly filed in the county records.18 Such a
lien also instantly attaches to and binds any real estate subsequently acquired
by the debtor.' 9 The debtor's homestead is protected from such liens at any
time after homestead status has been established, but homestead status may
not be brought into being to defeat a preexisting lien. 20 Thus, under Florida
law a prior recorded judgment lien against a piece of property will prevail
8. Cases cited note 7 supra.
9. FLA. CONsr. art. X, §1 (1885); FLA. CONST. art. X, §4(a) (1968).
10. FLA. STAT. §222.01 (1967).

11. FLA. STAT. §222.02 (1967). It should be made clear that this statute refers only to
the time that one may designate a homestead for exemption and does not refer to when
homestead status must be established.
12. FLA. CONsT. art. X, §1 (1885); FLA. CONST. art. X, §4 (1968).
13. One hundred and sixty acres of contiguous land outside of a municipality or half
of one acre within the limits of any incorporated city or town. FLA. CONsT. art. X, §1 (1885);
FLA. CONsT. art. X, §4 (a) (1968).
14. Anemaet v. Martin-Senour Co., 114 So. 2d 23, 26 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959). Lack of occupancy here, however, caused the claim to fail.
15. Hill v. First Nat'l Bank, 73 Fla. 1092, 1101, 75 So. 614, 617 (1917). The court said
here that if the claimant merely retains possession of the land it is of sufficient value to
him to have it protected and it is of no concern to the creditor that another has superior
title.
16. Bessemer Properties, Inc. v. Gamble, 158 Fla. 38, 39, 27 So. 2d 832, 833 (1946).
17. Crosby & Miller, supra note 4, at 23.
18. Giddens v. McFarlan, 152 Fla. 281, 284, 10 So. 2d 807, 809 (1943); FLA. STAT. §55.10
(1967).
19. Porter-Mallard Co. v. Dugger, 117 Fla. 137, 139, 157 So. 429, 430 (1934).
20. First Nat'l Bank v. Peel, 107 Fla. 413, 416, 145 So. 177, 178 (1932).
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against the subsequent creation of homestead status in such property. 21 Only
where the homestead status and the lien attach simultaneously, as in the case
of a purchase or inheritance of land by a judgment debtor who immediately
establishes residence as a homestead, will priority be accorded to the home22
stead claim.
Respondent in the instant case based her claim of priority upon two
distinct theories. Because Aetna failed to execute judgment against the property until after the fee ownership and accompanying homestead status came
into being, respondent contended that the homestead claim would prove
superior to the recorded judgment. In rejecting this contention, the Florida
supreme court ruled that the prior recorded judgment became a lien on the
land at the instant respondent acquired an interest in the property. Thus,
the attachment of the lien upon respondent's remainder interest prevented
any subsequent creation of homestead status. 23 This ruling assumed that no
homestead right existed at the time of the inheritance, despite respondent's
possession and role as family head, because a homestead claim cannot attach
to a remainder interest. 24 Thus, the court ruled that because the recorded
judgment attached to the remainder as soon as the remainder was acquired
by the respondent, this particular estate prevented both a homestead claim
based upon the remainder interest and a subsequent creation of homestead
2
status once the fee title had vested. 5
The respondent's alternative argument was that her actual possession
following the death of her father was sufficient to support a claim of homestead. Although the court has held that any right or interest the head of a
21. Lyon v. Arnold, 46 F.2d 451,452 (5th Cir. 1931).
22. Quigley v. Kennedy & Ely Ins., Inc., 207 So. 2d 431, 433 (Fla. 1968). Cf. Comment,
Homestead Exemption:Extension of Protection After Judgment, 21 U. FLA. L. REv. 134
(1968).

23. Here the court ruled that after the lien automatically attached to respondent's
remainder interest when it was inherited, Florida precedent proscribed any future creation
of homestead status. A careful study of the cases cited by the court, however, reveals that
in each instance the execution occurred before homestead status was established. In the
instant case the execution levy did not occur until after homestead status became clearly
established. Giddens v. McFarlan, 152 Fla. 281, 10 So. 2d 807 (1943); Porter-Mallard Co.
v. Dugger, 117 Fla. 137, 157 So. 429 (1934); First Nat'l Bank v. Peel, 107 Fla. 413, 145 So.
177 (1932); Pasco v. Harley, 73 Fla. 819, 75 So. 30 (1917); Abernathy v. Gruppo, 119 So. 2d
398 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
24. As authority for this, the court cited: Anemaet v. Martin-Senour Co., 114 So. 2d 23
(2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959). Examination of that opinion reveals that the source of this conclusion was 26 AM. Jur. Homestead §61 (1940). Under the same title in American Jurisprudence
2d, however, this additional and more definitive passage is found: "If the remainderman
becomes possessed of the property by determination of the life estate before the creditor
enforces his lien, the debtor may claim a homestead right in the property and thereby arrest
the creditor's right to sell on execution." 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homestead §59 (1968). The same
view also appears in 40 C.J.S. Homesteads §82 (1944).
25. Note 23 supra. Although the court properly cites previous opinions, which held
that homestead property is subjected to levy under judgments recorded prior to the time
such property became the homestead of the judgment debtor, the rule appears to be
dictum since the facts of each case indicate that the execution levy rather than the attachment of the lien was the element that precluded the subsequent establishment of a homestead.
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family has in the land occupied by the family should be construed liberally
to support a homestead claim, 26 in the principal case the court refused to find

in the land the necessary present interest to support a homestead claim. Thus,
despite the fact that the mother's infirmity precluded her right to claim a
homestead in her life estate, 27 the court's opinion indicates that actual possession of the land with the permission of the life tenant is not an interest
upon which a remainderman may claim homestead and thereby protect both
the present occupancy and the future estate. Because a homestead claim must
be based upon the right of possession resting in the head of the family,28
the opinion indicates that in similar circumstances neither the life tenant
nor the remainderman may benefit from the provisions of homestead
exemption.
The principal decision may be criticized on several different grounds:
(1) The court has ruled in the past that any interest in land, including mere
possession with the consent of the owner, is sufficient to support a claim of
homestead by the occupant. 29 By holding that a remainder interest, even
when coupled with actual possession, will not support a homestead claim, the
court is not only going against its own precedents, but also is narrowing the
scope of the homestead exemption30 In effect, the court has established a new
rule applicable to remaindermen, who are now excluded from the liberal interpretation of ownership accorded to other homestead claimants. (2) The
principal case can readily be distinguished from those cited by the court as authority for the proposition that once a judgment lien attaches to the land, a
subsequent homestead cannot be established to defeat the lien.31 In each of the
cited cases, both the lien and the execution levy had been established prior to
the homestead claim. In addition, each of the cases involved a fact situation
wherein the claimant sought after execution to establish homestead status
solely to defeat the lien and protect the land.32 Thus, these cases are inappli-

26. Bessemer Properties, Inc. v. Gamble, 158 Fla. 38, 39, 27 So. 2d 832, 833 (1946).
27. The constitution requires that one be the head of a family in order to claim a
homestead. FLA. CONsT. art. X, §1, (1885); FLA. CONST. art. X, §4(a) (1968). Here, respondent became the head of the family by right of her support of her invalid mother and
infant child.
28. Abernathy v. Gruppo, 119 So. 2d 398, 399 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960); Crosby & Miller,
supra note 4, at 31. But see Bessemer Properties, Inc. v. Gamble, 158 Fla. 38, 27 So. 2d 832
(1946).
29. Hill v. First Nat'l Bank, 73 Fla. 1092, 1101, 75 So. 614, 617 (1917).
30. The reasoning of the present court is that because a remainder interest creates no
present right to possession, the use essential to a homestead claim is not present. Yet here
the occupancy and use that are deemed necessary to make the land sufficiently valuable to
the claimant are, in reality, present.
31. The court cited: Giddens v. McFarlan, 152 Fla. 281, 10 So. 2d 807 (1943); PorterMallard Co. v. Dugger, 117 Fla. 137, 157 So. 429 (1934); First Nat'l Bank v. Peel, 107 Fla.

413, 145 So. 177 (1932); Pasco v. Harley, 73 Fla. 819, 75 So. 30 (1917); Abernathy v. Gruppo,
119 So. 2d 398 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
32. In each instance there was no intent to occupy the land as a homestead until
after the lien. In Abernathy and Giddens no actual homesteads were ever created. In PorterMallard the judgment debtor first attempted to erect a home on the land after the judgment.
In Pasco the judgment debtor was married two weeks after the execution levy. In First
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cable to the present situation where the creation of the homestead status, in
fact if not in law, occurred simultaneously to the attachment of the lien, and
a legal homestead claim preceded the execution. (3) Rather than distinguish
between liens incurred through the purchase or improvement of the land and
liens bearing no relation to the land, the court has subjected the homes of
judgment debtors to forced sale by general creditors. 33 In the case of
remainder interests, which are established by statute to guarantee that the
heirs inherit the homestead of their ancestor, an unencumbered inheritance
becomes impossible when the heir is a judgment debtor. 34 Thus, the instant
decision expressly negates the legislative intent of the descent statute. (4)
Of the greatest significance, however, is the fact that the principal opinion
clearly goes against the intent of the homestead provisions of the constitution.
The decision does not reflect the strengthened language of the new constitution,35 but construes the law to the detriment of those in greatest need of the
homestead benefits. The constitution clearly provides that homesteads be
protected from both forced sale and the attachment of judgment liens. 3r
Seemingly, this would mean that a judgment creditor could not submit to
forced sale a piece of property even if his lien preceded the establishment of
homestead. Once a homestead is established, the constitution clearly provides
that it cannot be subjected to forced sale. The dissenting opinion of Justice
37
Roberts, concurred in by Justice Ervin, suggests this approach:
The humane reasons for this protection of the home against general
creditors have been announced many times. The respondent LaGasse
was head of a family composed of herself and an infant child. She
has a judgment creditor who seeks to levy on a homestead owned and
occupied by her. In my opinion, Section 1, Article X, Florida Constitution 1885, and Section 4, Article X, Florida Constitution as Revised
1968, clearly prohibit the levy of execution.
The present holding is contrary to both Florida judicial precedent and,
of greater significance, the intent of the people of Florida as reflected in their
adoption of the new constitution. Homesteads established before the execution levy should be protected against forced sale by general creditors. Prohibiting the subsequent establishment of the homestead status after the attachNational Bank the judgment debtor moved his family onto the land after the execution.
Thus, each of these cases differs factually from the instant case.
33. Compare, e.g., Pasco v. Harley, 73 Fla. 819, 75 So. 30 (1917), with Milton v. Milton,
63 Fla. 533, 58 So. 718 (1912).
34. FLA. STAT. §731.27 (1967) provides that the homestead shall descend to the widow
for life with a vested remainder to the heirs in being at the time of the death of the decedent. Thus, in the context of the present situation, rather than guaranteeing that the
homestead will descend to the heirs, the decision allows the land to be taken by any general creditors of the devisees.
35. That the homestead "shall be exempt from forced sale under process of any court"
has been revised and now reads: "There shall be exempt from forced sale under process
of any court, and no judgment, decree or execution shall be a lien thereon ... :' FLA.
CoNsr. art. X, §1 (1885); FLA. CoNsr. art X, §4(a) (1968).
36. FLA. CONsr. art. X, §1 (1885); FLA. CoNsr, art. X, §4(a) (1968).
37. 223 So. 2d 727, 730 (Fla. 1969).
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